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THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF APPELLATE
ADJUDICATION
HEIDI LI FELDMAN*
ABSTRACT

This Article concerns two topics that, I hope to show, are vitally
connected One is the distinctive importance of appellate adjudication in
the legal system of United States. The other is the working of entangled
concepts in the law. This Article argues that courts engineer entangled
legal concepts via appellate adjudication, and it is in this respect
appellate adjudication is both crucialand unique, at least in the U.S. legal
system. Entangled concepts intertwine description and evaluation. They
also facilitate and constrain legal reasoningand legaljudgments, in ways
that distinguish legal adjudication from pure politics or the
implementation ofpublic policy. This article demonstrates more fully what
it is for a legal concept to be entangled and how entanglement supplies
guidance in adjudication. This Article carefully examines the background
to MacPherson v. Buick and Justice Benjamin Cardozo's particular reengineering of 'negligence' and 'duty', entangled concepts belonging to
the same legal taxonomy. This Article also examines how the UnitedStates
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Supreme Court has engineered 'commerce', itself an entangledconcept, in
order to show that conceptual engineering of entangled concepts occurs
outside the context of state common law. The claims made here apply to
appellate adjudication in any area of law. Whether we are dealing with
private law, public law, common law, or statutory law, or Constitutional
law, the defining feature of appellate adjudication is its continuous
engineering and reengineeringof entangledlegal concepts. The merger of
fact and value in these concepts explains both the fertility of appellate
adjudication and some of the constraints judges work under when they
work with legal concepts that entanglefact and value.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Appellate adjudication in the United States remains a poorly
understood practice. People agree that it is not identical to administrative
rulemaking or to the legislative process, but they no longer believe that
appellate courts discover law rather than make it. Furthermore, too often
people associate appellate adjudication with common law and particularly
with private law, despite the fact that appellate courts address legal
questions that arise from regulations, statutes, and the Constitution itselfall generally regarded as quintessential areas of public, codified law. In
order to appreciate the distinctiveness of appellate adjudication, this article
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looks to a specific vital function characteristically performed by appellate
courts: the engineering of entangled legal concepts.
In entangled concepts, the descriptive and the evaluative are
fundamentally interrelated such that when one aspect is reshaped so is the
other.' This provides a check on the malleability of legal concepts: insofar
as one does not wish to disturb the evaluative point of a concept, one
cannot unthinkingly modify its descriptive reach, and vice versa. In
entangled legal concepts, the descriptive and the evaluative check and
balance one another. However, entanglement does allow for the
modification or reengineering of entangled legal concepts. As
circumstances and values change, appellate courts can put these changes to
work to redesign an entangled concept that has become outmoded. If the
concept's evaluative point is obsolete, this will drive a modification in its
descriptive reach that responds to a revised understanding of the relevant
values. Likewise, if the descriptive reach of the concept no longer serves
its evaluative point, courts can update the concept's situational range. In
either case, though, the aspect of the concept undergoing revision must
answer to the other aspect: the descriptive and evaluative cannot be
understood or engineered independently of one another.

1. Contemporary philosophers have been reexamining concepts that blend description and
evaluation ever since the 1985 publication of Bernard Williams' book ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF

PHILOSOPHY (Fontana Press, 1985). Williams contrasted ethically "thick" concepts, which by virtue of
being culturally embedded were both "world-guided" and "action-guiding." Id. at 140-42, 150-52.
Williams' own work had roots in mid-twentieth century work by Philippa Foot and G.E.M. Anscombe,
both of whom questioned then current analytic philosophy's insistence upon strict separation of 'is'
from 'ought' and 'description' from 'evaluation.' See G.E.M. Anscombe Modern Moral Philosophy,
33 PHILOSOPHY 1-19 (1958); G.E.M. Anscombe, On Brute Facts, 18 ANALYSIS 69-72 (1958);

Philippa Foot, Moral Arguments, LXVll MIND 502-13 (1958); Philippa Foot, Moral Beliefs, 59
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 83-104 (1958). After the publication of ETHICS AND
THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY, a number of philosophers explored the relationship of description and

evaluation, particularly when seemingly entwined in single concepts. See, e.g., Peter Railton, Red,
Bitter, Good, in FACT, VALUES, AND NORMS, 131-47 (2003); Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn,
Morality and Thick Concepts, 66 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY (SUPPLEMENTARY)

267-99 (1992).
Philosopher Hilary Putnam approached the subject from a different slant than these philosophers
in his 2002 book THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOTOMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2004), itself

based on his 2000 Rosenthal Lectures. Id. at 2. In this Article, I follow Putnam in applying the term
"entangled" to concepts that resist reduction to discrete descriptive (fact) and evaluative (value)
components. Id. at 28.
In publications predating Putnam's popularization of the term "entangled concepts," I referred to
such concepts as "blend concepts", arguing for their importance to a conception of objectivity relevant
to law. Heidi Li Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1187 (1993). Very few
legal scholars have attended carefully to the significance of concepts that blend or entangle description
and evaluation. A recent exception is David Enoch and Kevin Toh, Legal as a Thick Concept, in THE
NATURE OF LAW:

CONTEMPORARY

PERSPECTIVES (W.J. Waluchow

forthcoming), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2122103.

& Stefan Sciaraffa eds.
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The idea of entanglement can be difficult to grasp, even though
entangled concepts are part of everyday thought as well as in specialized
or professional areas of thought. For a preliminary example, let us take a
conceptual realm rather removed from the legal. Consider concepts that
simultaneously describe and evaluate comedy, e.g. 'funny', 'droll', 'wry',
'silly', 'ridiculous', 'wacky', 'antic', 'absurd', and 'witty'. When applied,
these concepts pinpoint particular breeds of comedy, each with a
distinctive kind of humor deriving from particular settings and
characteristics. Together, these concepts comprise a taxonomy of the
comedic. When told that that a performance was 'wry', one would be
surprised to hear that it was a slapstick routine. Of course, there can be
innovations in humor. Somebody might create a form of slapstick that is
wry or droll, but in order for it to count as slapstick, it would still have to
be humorous in the particular way that slapstick is. One cannot simply
stipulate that one is performing slapstick. Slapstick is boisterous, rowdy,
physical comedy. If that kind of comedy can be wry or witty, then
slapstick can be wry or witty. If wryness or wit drives out the distinctive
features of slapstick, one may still have comedy or humor, but it will no
longer be slapstick.2 In comedy, no institutionalized body engineers the
concepts that describe and evaluate different kinds. This lack of
institutionalized oversight is true of most of our entangled concepts,
including ethical ones.
The body of this Article provides an extended analysis of two
engineered entangled legal concepts. Such analysis provides the fullest
insight into entanglement. What makes entangled legal concepts, and by
extension law itself, distinct is that entangled legal concepts do not simply
evolve and morph as part of a spontaneous process of development.
Judges, with input from lawyers, actively engineer entangled legal
concepts, shaping them so that they simultaneously describe and evaluate
in one way rather than another. Judges do this by extending or limiting the
situations in which entangled legal concepts apply by assigning them to
taxonomies shot through with certain values rather than others.
Understanding the specific entanglement in any concept that conjoins
description and evaluation requires a tremendous amount of background
knowledge-cultural, historical, sociological, anthropological, and

2. Note that even the concept 'comedic' is itself entangled. The concepts that fall under its
umbrella share both distinctive and evaluative features that make concepts comedic rather than, say,
tragic. This resemblance between concepts subsidiary to a more global entangled concept occurs in all
species of entangled concepts. So, entangled legal concepts will have in common features derived
from 'legal'-itself an entangled concept.
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psychological. Engineering entanglement calls for this knowledge too. The
knowledge that enables us to use or understand the concept may now be
tacit, but to appreciate judicial engineering we must make explicit the
circumstances faced by the original appellate engineer. Through this
process, we become more sensitive to today's appellate engineering of
concepts, examining more carefully the underlying circumstances that
influence how courts entangle description and evaluation within specific
legal concepts, making them as discrete as 'slapstick' or 'drollery'.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, the only way to appreciate the discreteness
and concomitant force of entangled legal concepts is to plunge into the
nexus of description and evaluation that structures them, rather than trying
to impose upon them a distinction between description and evaluation or
examining them out of the context in which they have emerged.
An analogy to another kind of entanglement may help here. In quantum
mechanics, entanglement refers to the situation where the state of one
object cannot be fully described without considering another. This
situation exemplifies a quantum state. Quantum states make a complete,
simultaneous description of all particles impossible, because describing an
aspect of one part of a quantum system changes the description of the
other in nondeterministic ways. In order to understand the quantum world,
one must understand the relationship between entangled objects.
Information about one part of an entangled state is irreducibly partial, so
for a fuller picture, the entanglement itself must be appreciated.
When courts engineer entangled concepts, they may start from either
the descriptive or the evaluative aspect of the prior version of the concept.
But as they develop one facet, the other always comes into play, shifting in
response or making it impossible for a court to modify the first facet
because such a shift renders the concept unworkable or unconvincing.
Conceptual engineering of entangled concepts always involves both the
descriptive and the evaluative aspects of such concepts, even when the
engineer herself cannot specify in advance precisely how modifying one
aspect will affect the other. Conceptual engineering remains an open-

3. As Erwin Schrodinger, the first explorer of entanglement in quantum physics, described it:
"When two systems, of which we know the states by their respective representatives, enter into
temporary physical interaction due to known forces between them, and when after a time of mutual
influence the systems separate again, then they can no longer be described in the same way as before,
viz. by endowing each of them with a representative of its own. I would not call that one but rather the
characteristic trait of quantum mechanics, the one that enforces its entire departure from classical
lines of thought. By the interaction the two representatives [the quantum states] have become
entangled." E. Schrodinger, Discussion of Probability Relations Between Separated Systems, 31
MATHEMATICAL PROC. CAMBRIDGE PHIL. SoC'Y 555 (1935) (emphasis added).
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ended process, neither constrained nor static. To fully understand
entangled concepts and how they get engineered calls for a focus on the
entanglement that gives these concepts their particular content.
In following sections, this article examines two examples of appellate
engineering of entangled legal concepts: first, 'negligence' in the litigation
that leads to Justice (then Chief Judge) Benjamin Cardozo's decision in
MacPherson v. Buick; and second, 'commerce' in the line of Supreme
Court cases that brought us to last Term's adjudication4 of the question of
the facial constitutionality of the individual mandate in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Health Care Act.5 The in-depth analyses
presented below further clarify the nature and workings of entangled
concepts and demonstrate how appellate courts engineer, reengineer, and
even dismantle them. This engineering is the defining feature of appellate
review, whether that review occurs as consideration of common law, a
statute, or an agency rule or regulation. The task is vital. Entangled legal
concepts serve to simultaneously carve the world descriptively and
evaluatively, enabling legal reasoning to proceed as parties navigate the
way fact and value intertwine throughout the law. Some concepts
engineered by appellate courts appear in statutes and regulations,
sometimes because these legislative and administrative materials borrowed
them from judicial opinions in the first place, and sometimes because
courts become the engineers of concepts that first appeared in a statute,
rule, or regulation. Whatever the source of the entangled legal concept, it
is by working on it that appellate adjudication differs from other areas of
legal process.
Appellate judges can and do radically and consciously engineer and
reengineer entangled concepts. No other legal actor effects change at such
a foundational level and on such a routine and ongoing basis. Legislatures
can, potentially, make sweeping structural changes-e.g., in labor
relations or whether gays may be open about their sexual orientation while
serving in the military. Furthermore, legislative law is overtly political or
stipulative; it need not answer to a conceptual scheme that itself exerts
developmental pressure on the concepts that comprise it. 6 Appellate courts

4. Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus. et al. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
1 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
5. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029.
6. Some legislation, however, is drafted with entangled legal concepts. This type of statute is a
natural candidate for the sort of change through appellate adjudication that occurs when law comes
straight from adjudication. A full exploration of entangled concepts embedded in statutes and
constitutions is beyond the scope of this Article.
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shape the law differently. They work concept by concept, and must answer
to the constraints imposed by the entangled concepts themselves.
II.

ENTANGLEMENT AND AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURER LIABILITY

In order to clarify and explain entangled concepts, and how in the
course of appellate adjudication they can be engineered, I begin with
MacPherson v. Buicki. When law students study this case, they learn that
it stands for the elimination of the privity requirement (the requirement of
contractual or quasi-contractual relationship) between an injured plaintiff
and a maker of the defective product that injured him or her. For the
purposes of the development of the law of products liability, this takeaway makes sense. But from the perspective of how New York's highest
court reached its conclusion, this future oriented understanding is
anachronistic. Looking forward from Cardozo's opinion, rather than
backward to its particular underpinnings, misses some significant data
important for understanding the engineering of entangled concepts,.
Ultimately, that data provides insight into how appellate judges engineer
concepts and a much richer understanding of the future effects of
Cardozo's engineering in MacPherson.
The central accomplishment of MacPherson in the context of its own
time was the way Cardozo dispensed with two somewhat entangled
concepts, 'imminent danger' and 'inherent danger,' so as to better engineer
'negligence', making its entanglement richer and arriving at a concept
better suited to a world of emerging mass production.. Dispensing with the
privity requirement made way for a full-fledged cause of action in
negligence for product-related injuries, and the reason the action was so
fully fledged was because of what the concept 'negligence' meant after
MacPherson.
A. Before MacPherson:Thomas v. Winchester
Fifty years before MacPherson, another New York case, Thomas v.
Winchester,8 first used 'imminent danger' to permit a cause of action in
negligence regardless of whether or not privity existed between the injured
party and the seller of the harmful product. Thomas involved a similar fact
pattern and yielded a similar legal outcome as MacPherson, yet it failed to
introduce a properly engineered entangled concept that could clearly

7. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916).
8. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
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identify when to ignore the privity limitation on a negligence action
involving a sale of goods. Instead, the Thomas court muddled the concept,
which was not clarified until Cardozo's reengineering of 'negligence' and
'duty'. Like MacPherson, Thomas involved a sales chain of distribution
that started before the manufacturer and included intermediaries other than
the immediate retailer.Winchester was a wholesaler in medicinal herbs in
New York City, and had bought out Gilbert, another wholesaler in
medicinal herbs located in New York City. 9 Winchester packaged jars of a
medicinal herbal remedy-the product in this case-for distribution to
retailers. 10 Some of the herbs put into the jars were manufactured by
Winchester on premises; others were bought from outside suppliers.''
Before distribution, Winchester labeled the jars: "prepared by A.
Gilbert."l12

Mary Ann Thomas, the person injured by the extract in question, lived
in upstate New York, in the town of Cazenovia, approximately 20 miles
southeast from Syracuse and 175 miles northeast from New York City."
She had fallen ill. 14 At the direction of her physician, Thomas's husband
purchased what he believed was a medication based on dandelion.15 He
bought it from a local retailer, Dr. Foord, who was a physician and
druggist in Cazenovia.16 Dr. Foord dispensed the medicine from a jar
labeled "1/2 lb. dandelion, prepared by A. Gilbert, No. 108, John-street,
N.Y." 17 Dr. Foord had purchased this container from James A. Aspinwall,
a druggist in New York City.' 8 Aspinwall, in turn, had purchased the
container of medicine from Winchester. 19 However, the actual extract in
the jar was purchased from a supplier and was not manufactured by
Winchester or Gilbert personally. 2 0
Upon taking the medicine, Mrs. Thomas suffered "very alarming
effects." 21 This was because the jar did not contain dandelion but in fact

9. Id.at 405-06.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 406 ("The jars were labeled in Gilbert's name because he had been previously engaged
in the same business on his own account . . . and probably because Gilbert's labels rendered the
articles more salable").
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.at 405.
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contained belladonna, a poison.22 In extract form, dandelion and
belladonna have similar outward characteristics, but experts can still
distinguish them through "careful examination." 23 Although Mrs. Thomas
suffered acutely, she survived. She and her husband sued Winchester,
alleging negligence in mistaking belladonna for dandelion.24
At trial Winchester moved for a nonsuit, primarily because "the
defendant was the remote vendor of the article in question: and there was
no connection, transaction or privity between him and the plaintiffs, or
either of them."2 5 The reasoning here could not be clearer: since the
plaintiff had not dealt directly with the defendant, they were not connected
so as to give rise to a duty of care on the defendant's part. The trial judge
rejected the motion for nonsuit and a jury trial followed.26 The jury
instructions charged that the jury should find for the plaintiff if they found
Winchester to be negligent and the various middlemen not negligent. 27 The
plaintiff prevailed.
On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court,
began its analysis by making the question of privity determinative of
whether the action could be brought: "If, in labeling a poisonous drug with
the name of a harmless medicine, for public market, no duty was violated
by the defendant, excepting that which he owed to Aspinwall, his
immediate vendee, in virtue of his contract of sale, this action cannot be
maintained." 28 The court began with the analysis of duty stated in
Winterbottom v. Wright,29 where duty extends only between the parties to
the contract and "[m]isfortune to third persons, not parties to the contract,
would not be a natural and necessary consequence of . . . negligence."o

The court implies that negligence that does not naturally and necessarily
produce injury in third parties is "not . . . imminently dangerous to human

life.""
But the court then immediately relegated Thomas to a different
category. Remarking that the "defendant was a dealer in poisonous drugs,"
the court pointed out the act of mislabeling belladonna would "natural[ly]

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 407-08.
10 Mees. & Welsb. 109.
6 N.Y. at 408.
Id.
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and almost inevitabl[ly]" lead to the death or grave injury "of some
person."32 The concept of 'imminent danger' was the linchpin of the
court's reasoning:
In

respect to

the

wrongful ... character

of the

negligence

complained of, this case differs widely from those put [forth] by the
defendant's counsel. No such imminent danger existed in those
cases. In the present case the sale of the poisonous article was made
to a dealer in drugs, and not to a consumer. The injury therefore was
not likely to fall on him, or on his vendee who was also a dealer; but
much more likely to be visited on a remote purchaser, as actually
happened. The defendant's negligence put human life in imminent
danger. Can it be said that there was no duty on the part of the
defendant, to avoid the creation of that danger by the exercise of
greater caution? or that the exercise of that caution was a duty only
to his immediate vendee, whose life was not endangered? 33
The court made clear that when a defendant creates imminent danger a
duty of care arises in tort because of the likelihood of the danger
occurring, and that a duty arises regardless of the contractual relation, or
lack thereof, between the victim and the one who negligently created the
danger. Indeed, the court appreciated that in an established chain of sales,
a contractual transaction with somebody other than the victim might be
one of the steps that renders the fruition of the harm even more likely. The
court stated:
The defendant's duty arose out of the nature of his business and the
danger to others incident to its mismanagement. Nothing but
mischief like that which actually happened could have been
expected from sending the poison falsely labeled into the market;
and the defendant is justly responsible for the probable
consequences of the act. The duty of exercising caution in this
respect did not arise out of the defendant's contract of sale to
Aspinwall. The wrong done by the defendant was in putting the
poison, mislabeled, into the hands of Aspinwall as an article of
merchandise to be sold and afterwards used as the extract of
dandelion, by some person then unknown.... The defendant's
contract of sale to Aspinwall does not excuse the wrong done to the

32. Id. at 408-09.
33. Id. at 409 10.
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plaintiffs. It was a part of the means by which the wrong was
effected 3

Thus, the Thomas court distinguished the basis for contract liability from
tort liability for personal injury from a product. The court's reasoning
seems to do more than carve out an exception to the privity rule that
permits a case to be won on negligence; its basis for holding the defendant
liable resembles more of a preliminary theory of strict product liability for
an industrialized society. If taken to its logical end, Thomas v. Winchester
could have had the effect MacPherson did. On one reading, the case
simply dispenses with the privity requirement as a prerequisite for
bringing a negligence suit against a product manufacturer. However, this
is not how courts between Thomas and MacPherson did read the case.
Instead, they read Thomas as creating a limited exception to the otherwise
ongoing assumption that only one in privity with a manufacturer could sue
that manufacturer in negligence for compensation for personal injuries.
B. Privity, Sales, PersonalInjury
The concept of 'privity' comes from contract law, defined by the
dictionary as follows:
[P]rivity 1. The connection or relationship between two parties,
each having a legally recognized interest in the same subject matter
(such as a transaction, proceeding, or piece of property); mutuality
of interest

<privity of contract>.

. .

. privity of contract. The

relationship between the parties to a contract, allowing them to sue
35
each other but preventing a third party from doing so.
Prior to industrial production of complicated products with widespread
distribution via various wholesalers and retailers, privity tracked the sort
of connections and obligations tort law aimed to capture with negligence.
The concept of privity brought to sales an evaluative-descriptive tangle
epitomized by the principle of caveat emptor. Caveat emptor-buyer
beware-was a mainstay of the traditional common law of sales. It
presupposed a world in which the buyer of goods bore the burden of
understanding their benefits and risks and deciding whether to purchase
them and at what price in light of both. The buyer had an obligation to
collect whatever information she needed to arrive at a sensible trade-off.

34. Id.
35. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1320 (9th ed. 2009).
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This presupposed that the information about the nature of goods was either
obvious to buyers or readily obtainable by them. And this would be the
case when the seller of the good was also its maker, because in the course
of the sales transaction, the buyer could ask questions or investigate the
product. When products were neither complex nor novel, the buyer could
rely on his or her own background knowledge to assess the product's
safety and likelihood of defect, or at least use that knowledge to query the
seller. The buyer was responsible for protecting himself against the risks
of an ill-made product, either by refusing to buy it if he detected a defect
or bargaining for a lower price if he doubted the soundness of the
particular item. If, however, the item was negligently made and the
bargain between buyer and seller presupposed that it was not, privity not
only permitted the buyer to bring a cause of action, but also required the
seller to take responsibility for the faulty item and the injuries it caused.
The contractual connection tracked-arguably even gave rise to-the
obligation in corrective justice.
With the rise of modern manufacturing and distribution practices, the
tangle of facts and values embedded in 'privity' no longer addressed the
circumstances of personal injury and the demands of corrective justice.
Hence cases likes Thomas v. Winchester, where the court introduced
'imminent danger' as a way to override the application of the privity
requirement on the ground that a manufacturer who made available an
imminently dangerous product-e.g., a mislabeled poison-had an
obligation in corrective justice to the person who was among those who
would foreseeably suffer injury from imbibing the mislabeled medication.
But the Thomas court did not explicitly dispense with privity, and the
concept of privity continued to exert influence on the law of personal
injury in New York. If the privity requirement applied, third parties were
estopped from bringing actions for negligence. If on the other hand a
product that caused an injury could be cast within the concept of imminent
danger, the privity requirement fell away. Thus, a third party negligently
injured by that product could recover. As a result, contentious cases turned
on whether any given product was covered by the concept 'imminently
dangerous'. Such cases came up frequently. Litigants debated the status of
shop tools steam,36 scaffolding,3 7 and coffee urns.38 Likewise, the trial
court and lower appellate courts in MacPherson v. Buick supposed that the

36. Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494 (1873).
37. Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (N.Y. 1882).
38. Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478 (1909).
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case would turn on whether or not Mr. MacPherson's Buick was
imminently dangerous.
Instead, MacPherson v. Buick ultimately demonstrated that
'imminently dangerous' was not a concept adequately structured to specify
situations where 'privity' was inapt and liability should be found.
Similarly, it determined that the concept of imminent danger could not
mediate the tension that had arisen between 'privity' and 'negligence,'
both entangled concepts themselves. Mr. MacPherson had a contract, and
therefore a mutuality of interest in the transaction, with the dealer who
sold him his Buick. In turn, the dealer had a similarly structured contract
with Buick, the car manufacturer. But privity did not exist between Mr.
MacPherson and the manufacturer, who never engaged in a direct
transaction. Consequently, MacPherson could not sue the manufacturer.
Moreover, despite his serious injuries, he could not sue the dealer who had
sold him the car. While he and the dealer did transact directly, the dealer's
sale to MacPherson did not involve negligence. If privity controlled, the
case was a non-starter, an easy one, and MacPherson would go
uncompensated for his losses. If, however, MacPherson could establish
that the Buick was negligently made and that a negligently made
automobile belonged within the concept of imminently dangerous, he
could have succeeded in his action.
C. MacPherson v. Buick: Early Stages
As noted in the Introduction, appreciating a now well-entrenched piece
of appellate engineering requires a detailed understanding of the state of
affairs prior to the appellate court's accomplishment of that engineering.
This section of the article explores how the circumstances and legal status
of the case appeared to the lower courts that adjudicated MacPherson's
personal injury claim against Buick.
The first round in MacPherson v. Buick (MacPherson ) began with a
trial that ended at the conclusion of the plaintiff s evidence, when the trial
judge granted defendant's motion for a nonsuit.39 The first trial judge ruled
that, as a matter of law, MacPherson could not win because his evidence
did not establish anything that would exempt his case from the privity
limitation. On appeal, MacPherson argued that New York had created an
exception to the applicability of 'privity'. Specifically, he argued that if
the concept 'inherently dangerous' 4 0 extended to a particular product, this

39. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 153 A.D. 474, 474 (N.Y. App. Div. 1912).
40. Although Buick eventually attempts to distinguish between 'inherently dangerous' and
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trumped the application of 'privity', thereby permitting recovery by third
parties for injuries caused by the inherently dangerous product. The New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Division extensively
reviewed the trial record, and decided that the plaintiff had met his burden
of proof on the matter of defect in the wheel of the Buick he owned. 4 1 The
reviewing court then spoke to the conceptual matter at stake:
An accident (similar to the one that did happen) in the streets of any
city might easily injure many persons other than the immediate
occupants of the automobile. An accident at the place in question,
the approach to a populous village, a summer resort, in the month of
July, when people were accustomed to go to that village as a health
resort or for pleasure in considerable numbers, might easily be
attended with serious injury to other automobile users of the
highway, or persons walking thereon or driving thereon with horses
and wagons, so that the use which it was intended that this
automobile should be put to was a public use, to be used upon the
highways which were open to all the people. The automobile was
likely to be used in a city or populous village or upon State roads
much frequented by automobile users and other people, and hence
the injuries that might be apprehended from manufacturing and
selling an insecure vehicle, a vehicle composed of inferior, untested
materials, would be to other people as well as to the actual
occupants of the car.42
This passage resonates with the reasoning of Thomas v. Winchester. The
appellate court explicitly introduced a worldview that countered the one of
caveat emptor and its associated entangled concepts. At the center of this
world was anonymously created risk, "an accident in the streets of any
city," capable of wounding people gathered there and causing "[ilnjur[y]
[to] many persons other than the immediate occupants of the
automobile."43 The court noted that cities are known gathering places, with
attractions that draw people toward potential danger, and this case

involved "a populous village, a summer resort, in the month of July, when
people were accustomed to go to that village as a health resort or for

'imminently dangerous' appliances, the courts use the terms interchangeably and always in the sense
of 'imminently dangerous' as shaped by Thomas v. Winchester.
41. MacPherson, 153 A.D. at 476-77.
42. Id. at 477-78.
43. Id. at 477.
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pleasure in considerable numbers."4 4 The court pictured public streets
bustling with people, horses, and wagons; all of whom could be injured by
one defective automobile. Such injury would come as no surprise, given
the risk created.
With this imagery as preface, the appellate court turned to precedent. It
chose Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co. 45 as the definitive case on point. Decided in
1908 by New York's first level appellate division, Statler v. Ray permitted
the plaintiff to recover damages for personal injures caused by a defective
commercial coffee urn that exploded, scalding bystanders.4 6 Although one
of the bystanders was the purchaser of the urn (and therefore in privity
with the seller), the other was not.4 7 The MacPherson I court found that
the Statler court permitted recovery because the urn-manufacturer knew
how the urn would be used and the risks it presented. 48 According to the
MacPherson I court, Statler left open only "the question whether a
manufacturer and vendor of such an inherently dangerous appliance as this
was may be made liable to a third party" on a theory of negligence. 49 After
a string of cites taken from the Statler opinion, the MacPherson I court
concluded that negligence was an acceptable theory of recovery for
damages, and it remanded the case for a new trial, rejecting the original
nonsut. 0
Following Statler, the MacPherson I court emphasized the concept of
'inherent danger' in deciding that the privity limitation on liability would
not apply to an appliance or a machine. The MacPherson I court did not
explicitly state reasons for this effacement of privity, relying instead on
specifying the circumstances under which the automobile was used and
the foreseeability-from the manufacturer's point of view-of injury to
third parties if the vehicle were composed of "inferior, untested"
materials.51 Not surprisingly, when the case on remand went to trial, the
evidence presented spoke primarily to the question of whether the wooden
wheel on Mr. MacPherson's Buick was made with poor quality wood and
to whether the wheel could or should have been inspected by Buick for the
quality of the wood in its spokes. The plaintiff also presented evidence as

44. Id. at 477.
45. Statler v. Ray Mfg. Co., 125 A.D. 69 (N.Y. App. Div. 1908), rev'd on other grounds, 195
N.Y. 478 (1909).
46. MacPherson, 153 A.D. at 478.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 478-79.
51. Id. at 477-79.
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to his damages. The defendant's evidence focused on whether the plaintiff
had driven carelessly.
The time and setting of the new trial influenced the findings of fact that
became part and parcel of 'negligence' as ultimately re-engineered by
Cardozo. In the early 1900s, cars were still relatively uncommon and what
may now seem like short distances took hours to travel. MacPherson
himself lived and worked in the small Village of Galway,52 just over
seventeen miles from both Saratoga Springs and Schenectady, which were
far larger towns also in upstate New York. A team of horses pulling a
carriage travelled at eight to ten miles per hour. To put this in
perspective, when Mr. MacPherson traveled the seventeen miles to
Schenectady to buy his Buick, the journey would have taken roughly two
hours by horse and carriage.
At Close Bros., in Schenectady, MacPherson purchased a 1910 Buick
Model 10 Runabout, with a four-cylinder, twenty-two and a one-half
horsepower engine.54 The 1910 Runabout was Buick's first big market
success, although automobiles had slowly begun to trickle into the market
starting in the mid-1890s. 5 5 The Model 10 Runabout hit the market two
years after Ford's Model T. 56 Buick's sales did not exceed 40,000 cars per
year until 1910, spurred by the Model 10's popularity.
So, although car sales were picking up at the end of the first decade of
the twentieth century, Mr. MacPherson was still something of an early
adopter. His business made owning a car particularly attractive to him. At
the time of the trial, he had worked for thirty-eight years as a stonecutter
and gravestone designer as well as a dealer in "monuments" and
gravestones. 8 In order to sell and deliver his work, he needed to travel
through a "large range of territory." 59 After purchasing the car in May,
1910, MacPherson and his son began using it for the monument business.

52. Case on Appeal at 45:16, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916), reprintedin
I RECORDS AND BRIEFS OF LANDMARK BENJAMIN CARDOZO OPINIONS 15 (William H. Manz ed.,
2001).
53. Timetable for the Wilmington & Weldon Railroad 1859, LEARN NC, http://www.learn
nc.org/lp/editions/nchist-antebellum/4828 (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
54. Case on Appeal, supra note 52, at 46: 16.
55. AACA Museum Collection, AACA MUSEUM, http://www.aacamuseum.org/exhibitions/perm
anent.aspx (last visited Aug. 29, 2012).
56. Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: MacPherson v. Buick and the Emergence of a Mass
Consumer Market, 23 LAw & HiST. REv. 1 (2005).
57. The Buick Automobile 1910 1919 & The Buick Motor Car Co., AMERICAN-AUTO
MOBILES.COM, http://www.american-automobiles.com/Buick-1910-1919.html (last visited Aug. 29,
2012).
58. Case on Appeal, supra note 52, at 15: 44.
59. Id at 15-16: 44-45.

20121

THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF APPELLATE ADJUDICATION

77

When winter came, MacPherson stored the car in his barn, where it was
dry and protected from the elements.o
When spring came, MacPherson resumed use of the automobile,
sometimes driving it for days at a time, at others leaving it idle while he
worked in his shop. One day that summer, MacPherson drove the car not
for business purposes, but to assist a friend, Charles Carr, whose brother,
John, needed to go the hospital in Saratoga Springs. John had a serious
injury to his hand that, combined with infection, incapacitated him for
work on his farm.
On the way to Saratoga, after picking up the Carrs, MacPherson
stopped at Ballston Spa for gasoline. After this stop, John, who was in
pain, sat in the front beside MacPherson, and Charles sat in the rumble
seat behind them. After driving a bit, MacPherson felt the "hind end of the
machine skid." 62 MacPherson testified that he was driving fifteen or
sixteen miles per hour at that time. As the car slipped, MacPherson "threw
off the power" and attempted to steer out of the skid. Having done so, he
proceeded to move to the middle of the road and restarted the car, steering
to the right side of the road. As MacPherson moved to the right, he heard a
crash and felt the rear of the car swerve to the left.64 He looked over his
shoulder and "saw the end of the machine swing around." 65 As the car
spun, MacPherson realized that he was heading toward a telegraph pole
just a couple of yards away. In an effort to avoid crashing the radiator of
the car directly into the pole, MacPherson steered the car away from the
pole, and ended up striking it on an angle. The car then swung around the
66
pole and rolled over.
The flip pinned MacPherson face down under the "hind axle of the
67
machine," with the weight of the axle on his back. MacPherson asked the
others, who he had not yet heard, to get the car off his back. Charles told
him he was trying to "lifft] all he could, but couldn't stir it." 6 8 Apparently,
Charles succeeded, because shortly thereafter, MacPherson was freed.
Using his uninjured hand, John Carr had managed to help Charles lift the
car, even though John was "in such pain that he didn't know what he was

60.
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65.
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doing." 69 MacPherson crawled out, and despite being "dazed ... more so
than [he] knew," he switched off the engine and hailed some people who
had heard the crash from a road nearby.70 They took MacPherson and the
Carrs to the hospital at Saratoga Springs.
MacPherson's injuries were extensive. He had cuts about his head, his
right eye was "torn apart entirely, laid down from the eye brow." He also
had a badly hurt back, his left leg was bruised, especially around the knee
and ankle, he had a broken right wrist, and fractured ribs. 2 He received
stitches for a cut beside his right ear and another fourteen stitches
elsewhere on his head. Despite the extent of the injuries, MacPherson
remained in the hospital for only a few hours. He "got a man from the
garage to take a machine and carry [him] home."74
MacPherson arrived home with his arm in a sling, his eye dressed but
painful, and dressings on the stitches. The next day he contacted a doctor
in Galway, Dr. Parent, who attended MacPherson for 24 days, during
which MacPherson was confined to his house. Dr. Parent visited every
day.77 At first, MacPherson remained close to bed, even though "the bed
was very painful." 78 He testified, "I was broken up so I couldn't stay there.
I couldn't sleep."79 After about a month, MacPherson made it to the porch
of his home. On Labor Day, he went to Saratoga Springs to collect the
wrecked Buick.80
The effects of MacPherson's injuries lingered. The fractured ribs and
broken wrist caused the 'worst trouble' for his pain during the winter
following the accident.81 To rehabilitate his hand, MacPherson spent the
winter attempting to flex his wrist against the walls and doors of his house
and he sawed and split wood to strengthen his arm. Despite these efforts,
at the time of the trial, two years after the accident, MacPherson's right
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wrist was still stiff. He reported: "[I] [h]aven't much use of it. The grip is
not good. There isn't much strength in it.""
MacPherson was right handed and he needed his hand to letter and lay
out the work on the monuments and gravestones with which he worked.8 4
At that time, lettering was done either by hand with a chisel and hammer
or with a pneumatic tool.85 Both methods became extremely difficult for
MacPherson. "The effect of using the hammer is very bad in the case of
the hand hammer. With the pneumatic tool it is bad, you have to twist your
hand so much, that is, the motion of the hand is restricted."8 Eventually,
MacPherson recovered sufficiently to be able to grip the hand hammer
without his hand cramping too much to hold on to it.8
His eyesight was another matter. Although he had worn glasses prior to
the accident, his eyesight was fairly good. After the accident, he could no
longer find glasses to correct his vision.88 His right eye failed quickly,
after having been shut and bandaged for two months after the accident.89
During this period, vision in MacPherson's left eye also began to
deteriorate, and by the time of the second trial, MacPherson could not "tell
people in the middle of street," and he could not find glasses to correct the
problem. 90
On cross-examination, Buick's lawyer tried to assert that MacPherson
was driving at an unsafe fast speed at the time of the accident. Against this
suggestion, MacPherson explained that while on the local road between
Galway and Ballston, he "went at an ordinary road gait," 9' twelve to
fourteen miles per hour. Then, when en route to Saratoga Springs from
Ballston, the road switched to "good, new macadam," 92 but he went no
more than twenty to twenty-five miles per hour.93 After the skid that
preceded the car's breakdown, he slowed to fifteen miles an hour.
MacPherson's reference to "road gait" sounds odd to the modern ear. But
"gait," as in a horse's gait, was still a natural way of speaking of pace in
1913. Horses and wagons were relevant frames of reference for thinking
about travel and how to travel safely.
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The testimony of John Carr, MacPherson's passenger, also adds to our
sense of the relationship between people and cars in upstate New York in
1911. John, a farmer, was twenty-five years old at the time of the accident.
He reported that he felt the rear of the car slide when it first skidded. He
could not answer whether this was a slight skid or not because, as he
explained, "I never rode in [an automobile] very much."94 Later, when
Buick's counsel tried again to establish that MacPherson was driving too
quickly when the accident occurred, John could not speak to the question,
saying only "I don't know much about the speed of an automobile. I
haven't ridden but three or four times in my life." 95 He did say that twenty
to twenty-five miles per hour was too fast for him and that he knew
Macpherson was not driving higher than that speed at the time of the
accident because he did not feel that the car was going too fast.
Buick's attorney also questioned Charles Carr, the other passenger,
about the events surrounding the accident. Charles was twenty-eight years
old at the time, three years older than his brother. 97 Charles began his
testimony by stating he was a farmer, a neighbor of MacPherson. Charles
testified that just prior to the accident, he felt the skid to the left, "just as
though the car swung to the left slightly, a slight skidding, of the hind
part." 98 Next, as "Mr. MacPherson pulled ahead of the skid," Charles "felt
the hind end go down and a sound like wood breaking. . . . It sounded like
a lot of wood breaking. . . . I could feel the car lower, the hind end; that

was the left hind wheel." 99 Pressed by Buick's counsel regarding the speed
at which MacPherson was driving at the time of the accident, Charles
explicitly couches the pace in terms of a horse's speed: "If a horse would
go eight miles an hour we wouldn't be moving that fast." 00
Because of the similarities between horse-drawn transportation and
automobiles, MacPherson was able to establish the defectiveness of his
car's left rear wheel. His attorney did not have to rely solely on Charles
Carr's report of the sound of breaking wood. When MacPherson was able
to collect his car at Saratoga Springs, the wreckage was incomplete, and
had changed hands and location several times. He was, however, able to
obtain the remains of the car's wheels, which were later used as exhibits at
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the trial.' 0' At trial, MacPherson's attorney called upon experienced
carriage and wheel makers for their opinions as to the wheels'
appropriateness for road travel. Some of the experts had worked on both
carriage and automobile wheels. 0 2 Each had worked at least twenty years
in the business; a couple had worked close to forty years.103
These tradesmen agreed that the spokes in the wheel were of inferior
hickory wood. They explained that they could tell primarily because of the
way the spokes snapped squarely off, rather than coming apart and leaving
behind "brooming." 04 The witnesses surmised that the wood from which
the spokes had been made had not been left to dry or "season" naturally, in
the open air.' 5 Some thought a kiln had been used, and they explained
how kiln drying made the wood brittle and prone to snap.10 6 They also
explained what they looked for in wood they used to make wheels, how
they examined the grain on a spoke to tell its quality.10' The expert
witnesses informed the court that the only way to examine a spoke's
quality thoroughly would be to look at the ends and at the side, and that if
the side were covered with paint, some would have to be scraped away to
make a full examination.108 If, however, the spoke were coated only in oil,
to protect it, it could still be examined.109
One additional witness testified regarding the testing of automobile
parts. Otto Kleinfelder was "an automobile expert by occupation."'110
Kleinfelder worked for the Thomas Car Company in Buffalo, where for
nine years he was a "tester."'" Kleinfelder explained that the Thomas Car
Company purchased its wheels from the Salisbury Wheel Company,
which delivered the wheels "in their natural wood . . . so that it would give

our inspectors a chance to look them over when they were received in the
Receiving Department."1 2 From the receiving department, Kleinfelder

101. Id. at 25 26: 74-75.
102. See id. at 50: 148 (testimony of George A. Palmer, a thirty-year veteran of the carriage
building and repair trade, who had worked on automobile wheels and carriages).
103. See id. at 57: 169 (testimony of Adelbert Payne, a carriage builder for twenty-two years).
Payne, like Palmer, had worked on both carriage and automobile wheels. Id. at 58: 171. See also id. at
72: 214 (testimony of James P. Tittlemeore, who testified to having been a carriage maker and general
repairer for thirty-eight years).
104. See id. at 51: 150-51, 52: 154-55, 53: 156, 59: 175-76.
105. See id. at 53: 154-55.
106. Id. at 80: 237 39, 81: 240-42.
107. Id. at 82: 245, 90: 268-69.
108. Id. at 62: 184, 82: 243.
109. Id. at 64: 189 90.
110. Id. at 92: 275.
111. Id. at 92-93: 275-76, 94: 279.
112. Id. at 93: 276.
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explained, the wheels went to the wheel department, where each one was
tested using hydraulic pressure."' After the cars were assembled, Thomas
Carr gave each one a road test of 80 to 100 miles on rough roads.1 14
Kleinfelder's testimony established consistency between one auto-maker's
testing practices and the information supplied by the wheelmakers'
testimony.
The expert witness testimony constitutes the better part of the evidence
MacPherson's counsel submitted at trial. Shortly after it was given, the
plaintiff rested and the defendant sought a nonsuit. Eight grounds were put
forth, most significantly the following: Buick noted that it was not in a
contractual relationship with MacPherson,'6 and that MacPherson had
presented no evidence of fraud;'" Buick stressed that even if the car were
inherently dangerous, MacPherson was contributorily negligent for not
driving more slowly;" 8 Buick claimed that MacPherson had neither
established an automobile manufacturer industry custom of checking for
defective wheels nor a feasible way for manufacturers to do so; 119 Buick
also maintained that "whatever obligation existed by the defendant to the
plaintiff, must find its foundation in the fact that the defendant's car was in
its nature an article eminently dangerous to life and property," 20 and that
the plaintiff had not established such a foundation. In short, Buick asserted
the privity limitation, claimed that any exception based on imminent
danger was moot because of the plaintiffs contributory negligence, and
that, at the end of the day, plaintiff had not established any negligence on
Buick's part. The court refused to nonsuit the plaintiff and also rejected
defendant's motion to direct the jury to find for it. 12 1
Buick's grounds for its motions indicate its own trial strategy as the
proceedings unfolded. To rebut plaintiffs case regarding Buick's
negligence in manufacture or inspection, Buick put on experts from
academia and the automobile industry, mainly engineers, who attempted to
discredit the plaintiffs experts regarding the quality of the hickory in the
wheel and the relative ease by which an automobile manufacturer could
check that quality.
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Buick's first witness was neither a working carriage wheel maker nor
an automobile "tester." The witness, W.K. Hatt, described himself and his
career as follows:
I am professor of Civil Engineering and director of the laboratory of
testing material of Pardue [sic] University at Lafayette, Indiana. I
graduated from the University of New Brunswick, in 1887, then
from Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., in 1891, with the degree of
Civil Engineer.

. .

. The science of applied mechanics deals with

motion and action of force and the application of force, respecting
the strain and determination of strength. 122
Professor Hatt went on to explain at some length that throughout his career
he had been involved in a federal government project to identify the grades
and strengths of various woods from forests throughout the United
States.123 Not surprisingly, this expert disagreed with the plaintiffs' experts
as to how best to evaluate whether hickory was suited for purposes of
making a car wheel. 124 Professor Hatt even performed an in-court
demonstration of his preferred method: the end of one of the spokes was
planed off, and the witness counted the rings per inch, and said that, at
least by this measure, the hickory was "first-class mechanical hickory." 25
Professor Hatt disputed the methods of assessment used by plaintiffs
experts, insisting that the he knew "of no means of ascertaining the quality
of hickory, aside from the rings and the weight." 26 Professor Hatt then
refrained from answering questions about automobile wheels in particular
and automobile skids and their effects on wheels, claiming that these
matters lay outside his expertise.127 Finally, Professor Hatt gave reasons
for doubting the usefulness of a hydraulic pressure test on automobile
wheels. He claimed that any such test would only be telling if the wheel
were subjected to enough pressure to break it during the test. 128
Upon cross-examination, Professor Hatt denounced the plaintiffs'
experts, claiming that one cannot gauge the weight of hickory accurately
by hefting it in one's hand.129 He also claimed that nobody could, as an
expert, "pass judgment, as to whether twelve spokes assembled here, as
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this was, that would ordinarily break off as square as these; were sound
hickory or fit to be used in spokes."130 After making these assertions,
Professor Hatt continued to testify at length under cross-examination, with
the primary effect of limiting his opinion so narrowly that it did not
address the question of the quality of the wheel at all.
Subsequent defense witnesses focused on the condition of the road at
the time of the accident and the speed at which they thought MacPherson
was driving. This testimony went on, at some length, to support the
contributory negligence theory advanced by the defendant. Defense
counsel also returned to the questions of whether automobile companies
customarily inspected wheels for the quality of the wood used in their
spokes, and whether the manufacturer could reasonably inspect for this.131
At the close of arguments, each side submitted proposed jury
instructions to the court. Buick submitted forty-six charges and
MacPherson eighteen, a large enough number for the judge to remark
upon. 132 The thrust of the charges asked the jury to decide whether a
negligently constructed automobile was imminently dangerous, and
whether or not Buick was negligent for its failure to inspect the wheels it
put into its cars. The court specifically refused charges that would have
had the jury impose the privity limitation on recovery.133 Buick's counsel
wrangled with the judge for charging that the jury could find that a
negligently constructed automobile could be imminently dangerous, and
fought for and succeeded in obtaining an instruction that an ordinary
automobile was not imminently dangerous.134 MacPherson's lawyer made
sure to insist upon the classification of a negligently made automobile as
an 'imminently dangerous' machine.
The jury awarded MacPherson $5,000.00 in damages.13 5 After the
judge announced the verdict, various post-trial motions were made,
including motions by the defendant to set aside the jury verdict, and for a
new trial.136 The judge rejected these. Moreover, he awarded to the
plaintiff an "extra allowance" to cover costs of the trial, in the amount of
$251.25.137
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D. MacPherson v. Buick: En Route to the New York Court ofAppeals
On intermediate appeal, the reviewing court ruled for the plaintiff,
rejecting every one of the defendant's contentions.13 8 The appellate court
presented the logic of the trial judge's charges simply and elegantly:
The Trial Justice charged the jury, in substance, that the defendant
was not liable unless an automobile with a weak wheel was, to the
defendant's knowledge, a dangerous machine, in which case the
defendant owed the plaintiff the duty to inspect the wheel and see
that it was reasonably safe for the uses intended; that if the machine
in the condition in which it was put upon the market by the
defendant was in itself inherently dangerous, and if the defendant
knew that a weak wheel would make it inherently dangerous, then
the defendant is chargeable with the knowledge of the defects to the
extent that they could be discovered by reasonable inspection and
testing.139
The intermediate appellate court claimed that even an ordinary person
would realize that a car with a weak wheel would be dangerous, thus
sustaining the jury charge and verdict that such a car was imminently or
inherently dangerous. 140
The intermediate appellate court harkened to a time when people would
inspect for themselves the wood in items they purchased. Evoking the
natural setting of caveat emptor, the court wrote:
In the old days, a farmer who desired to have wheels made for an
ox-cart would be apt to inspect the timber before it was painted,
before the wheel was ironed and the defects covered up, in order
that he might know what he was buying.... An ordinary man, in
buying a pitchfork, a golf club, an axe-helve, or an oar for a boat
will look at the timber, "heft it", and otherwise endeavor to
ascertain whether it is made of a suitable material. He is not
satisfied with the fact that he is buying it of a reputable maker. It is
not unreasonable to expect that the manufacturer of an automobile
will give some attention at least to the material which enters into a
wheel which he has purchased for use thereon.141
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The court analogized the manufacturer to the buyer of yore who had both
the obligation and the habit of inspecting raw materials to be used in his
goods. As Buick performed no inspection whatsoever, there was no room
to debate what kind of inspection would be sufficient under the law, and
the jury's verdict was upheld.
In the following excerpt from the court's opinion, note that while the
appellate court's opinion begins by discussing the issue of the imminent or
inherent dangerousness of an automobile with a weak wheel, its holding
does not use the concept of 'imminent danger' at all.
We hold that under the circumstances the defendant owed a duty to
all purchasers of its automobiles to make a reasonable inspection
and test to ascertain whether the wheels purchased and put in use by
it were reasonably fit for the purposes for which it used them, and if
it fails to exercise care in that respect that it is responsible for any
defect which would have been discovered by reasonable inspection
or test. 142
This holding foreshadows Justice Cardozo's opinion in the final appeal in
MacPherson. The intermediate appellate court substitutes the language of
"reasonable fitness for purpose" for the concept 'imminently dangerous'.
Its holding shows that the basis of the manufacturer's duty of care can be
better expressed by this language than by employing the concept of
'imminent danger' to classify some products but not others.
Nevertheless, the intermediate appellate court opinion left Buick's
counsel in a difficult position. The court supported both the concept of
'imminently dangerous' in the jury charge and the jury's determination
that a car with a bum wheel was imminently dangerous. Furthermore, the
court had ruled that Buick's total failure to inspect was, as a matter of a
law, a violation of the duty of reasonable inspection of an imminently
dangerous product. Yet the holding itself was not couched in the concept
of 'imminent danger.' In its final appeal to New York's highest court,
Buick decided to deemphasize the lower appellate court's holding,

ignoring its language of reasonable fitness for purpose, and attacking the
plaintiff's case with the traditional concept of 'inherently dangerous.' 43

142. Id at 435: 1303-04.
143. Brief on Behalf of Appellant, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916),
reprinted in I RECORDS AND BRIEFS OF LANDMARK BENJAMIN CARDOZO OPINIONS: DOc No. 2,
supranote 52.
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Buick maintained that "an automobile is not an inherently dangerous
article" 144 and therefore it had no liability "to a third party in simple
negligence."l 45 Then it took up the heart of its argument concerning
whether being defective did not render the automobile inherently
dangerous. This strategy immediately bogged Buick down in an effort to
distinguish 'imminently dangerous' from 'inherently dangerous'. Buick
argued that the trial court correctly charged the jury that a car "is not an
instrumentality inherently, that is, necessarily, intrinsically or per se
dangerous to human life." 146 Buick next asserted that inherent danger is
not the same as imminent danger, even if some courts used the terms
interchangeably.1 47 Then Buick delivered its own exposition of the history
of manufacturer liability.
According to Buick, the "expansion of Commerce" from the time of
the founding of the Union, led courts to attempt "to impose a liability on
vendors or manufacturers to third parties or subsequent purchasers."1 48
Indiscriminate imposition of liability would essentially force vendors or
manufacturers into a contractual relationship with parties unknown to
them, imposing all sorts of onerous duties on vendors and manufacturers,
and putting a serious crimp in the further growth of commerce. According
to Buick's brief, the law was able to prevent this undesirable result by
creating only two classes of articles whose manufacturers and vendors had
obligations of care beyond the privity line. 149 One category covered
articles "intended for human consumption" and the other covered "articles
inherently dangerous to human life."150 Since cars fell into the second
category, Buick concentrated on that one, thus eliminating the need for its
argument to address the Thomas v. Winchester precedent. Buick explained
how the classification of inherently dangerous articles gradually grew,
eventually including: "large steam boilers, or small steam boilers exposed
in public places, highly charged water bottles, and other articles which the
common experience of mankind demonstrated to be frequently liable to
accident, and to cause injury to persons using them."151
The brief writers presumably did not realize it, but this is the moment
in their argument that reveals the key weakness in the concept of
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'inherently dangerous'. The concept is simply too malleable and too much
at the mercy of ever-changing circumstances. It lacks a sufficient mesh of
the descriptive and the evaluative to permit structured, principled
application. If automobiles with defective parts often cause accidents, then
those automobiles, by Buick's own construction of the concept, are
'inherently dangerous'. Buick's delineation unintentionally revealed the
dispensability of the concept of 'inherently dangerous'. The important
question for deciding the case was whether or not an article is likely to
cause injury if negligently made. This is important because it is knowledge
of that likelihood which gives rise to the obligation to take reasonable
precautions. The 'inherently dangerous' standard does not ground a reason
for or against obligation, and it has no evaluative bite from the perspective
of tort, an area of law concerned precisely with when obligations of care
arise. Indeed, having given a construction that would include defective
cars, the Buick brief attempts another characterization of the concept of
'inherently dangerous': "Articles inherently dangerous to human life are
those which in their very nature are calculated to cause harm to mankind.
... Inherent means inborn, in the article itself." 152 This sort of effort to
confine the concept is doomed to failure. The telos of a carbonated bottle
of water, if it has one, is not to harm those who pick it up. But Buick itself
concurred with the many courts of the day that had found overcharged
bottles to be inherently dangerous.
Buick tried desperately to demonstrate that products with defects
should be treated differently than products "intrinsically" harmful to
human life. The brief attempted to distinguish the concept of 'inherently
dangerous' from the concept 'imminently dangerous,' arguing that the
latter concept covers any article with a defect likely to cause serious injury
to somebody else as opposed to those articles with danger "inborn" in
themselves. The brief reads: "[I]f it is established than an automobile is
not an article inherently dangerous to human life, it must not be said ...
that inherently and imminently have the same legal meaning."153
After this rather cryptic assertion, Buick moved on to restate the rule of
privity. Buick repeated that although the law created an exception for
inherently dangerous articles, the exception was not applicable in the
present suit, just as exceptions based on fraud do not apply. This might
seem odd because the plaintiff never alleged fraud against Buick, but
Buick used the fraud exception to distinguish cases that seemingly

152. Id. at 8.
153. Id. at 9.
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permitted recovery based on the danger presented by a defective product.
Essentially, Buick argued that all the precedents that override privity fall
into either the 'inherently dangerous' classification (which does not
include defective products) or the 'fraud' exception (which allows thirdparty recovery in the event of defect but only if the manufacturer
knowingly passed off the defective product). Buick's brief provides pages
of authority from state courts (including New York), federal courts, and
treatise writers all allegedly in support of these two classifications being
the only classification that trump privity, and which confines 'inherently
dangerous' products to a short list, including boilers, charged water
bottles, drugs, and medicines.15 4
Finally, in section three of its brief, Buick squarely addressed the
contention it anticipated from MacPherson-namely, that the law treats
imminently dangerous defective products in the same way as it treats
inherently dangerous objects in that both kinds escape the privity
limitation. Buick's brief called this "the crucial point." 55 Buick argued
that there were two distinct concepts in play. 'Inherent danger' gives rise
to the privity exception and does not apply to automobiles, whereas
'imminent danger' does not give rise to the privity exception. Thus,
regardless of whether a defective automobile is imminently dangerous, the
plaintiff in this case has no cause of action against the manufacturer
because they were not in privity.
Buick relied heavily on a case that arose in New York federal court
around the same time as MacPherson v. Buick. That case, Cadillac v.
Johnson, 5 was a negligence action based on facts very similar to
MacPherson: a defective wheel made with hickory spokes gave way and
plaintiff-driver suffered serious injuries.' The jury returned a verdict for
the plaintiff, which the defendant appealed. The appellate court rejected
the idea that a consumer could recover at common law for simple
negligence. 58 In its decision, the Second Circuit went out of its way to
reject the intermediate appellate New York decision in MacPherson,
avowing, "We are not persuaded to the contrary by the decision in
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co." 5 9 When Buick briefed the New York
State Court of Appeals, it relied on Cadillac as authority for the
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Id. at 36-49.
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Cadillac Motor Car Co. v. Johnson, 221 F. 801 (2d. Cir. 1915).
Id. at 802.
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proposition that a plaintiff could not recover in a simple negligence action
against a manufacturer unless a contractual relation between the parties
existed.o
According to Buick, the MacPherson trial court erred by using the
words "imminently" and "inherently" interchangeably in its jury charge.161
The brief argued that, in any event, whether an article belongs under one
heading or the other is a question of law, not fact, and should not be left to
a jury to decide.16 2 The brief then goes on to reiterate its theory on the
distinction between inherently dangerous articles, imminently dangerous
articles, and the role of fraud in overcoming the privity limitation.16 1
MacPherson's brief to the New York Court of Appeals presents the
procedural history of the case, including the theory of the plaintiffs case,
and then narrates the events of the accident and the testimony provided by
the experts.164 The brief also highlights a fact less prominently discussed at
trial:
The defendant published a catalogue and in a double page picture
under the words 'The Home of the Buick Motor Company' showed
the factories of the Imperial Wheel Company, which made the
wheel, and of the Weston-Mott Company which made the Buick
axles.165
While only a side note, the observation highlights the close relationship
between manufacturers and parts suppliers, common both then and now.
MacPherson's brief, like Buick's, addresses the 'inherent'/'imminent'
danger issue, although in a far different manner. First the MacPherson
brief argues that "[a]n automobile, propelled by explosive gases, certified
and put out, as here conceded, to run at a speed of fifty miles an hour, to
be managed by whomsoever may purchase it, is a machine inherently
dangerous." 166 The MacPherson brief notes that there are authorities to the
contrary. It explicitly casts the case as an opportunity to settle the
question, and to decide that a defective automobile is inherently
dangerous. Then, the brief rather grandly states, "Let us begin without any

160. Brief on Behalf of Appellant, supra note 143, at 9, 50.
161. Id. at 55.
162. Id. at 55-56.
163. Id. at 56-63. Buick's brief concludes with a lengthy criticism of the trial court's decision to
permit plaintiffs experts to testify as to the quality of the wood used in the wheels and the feasibility
of inspecting automobile wheels. Id. at 63.
164. Respondent's Brief, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916), reprinted
in I RECORDS AND BRIEFS OF LANDMARK BENJAMIN CARDOZO OPINIONS: Doc. No. 3, supranote 52.
165. Id. at 12.
166. Id. at 16.
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juggling over definitions,"1 6 7 yet then immediately defines "inherently" as
"inseparably" and "imminently" as "threateningly."16 8 Based on these
assertions, MacPherson's brief claims it is "common knowledge" that an
automobile in motion is inherently dangerous. 169
The same malleability of the concepts 'inherent' and 'imminent' that
plagued Buick's brief plagued the respondent's. Therefore, MacPherson's
counsel chose to use 'inherently dangerous' as the right concept to cover
an automobile. The brief makes an interesting move in support of this
contention. It claims that an automobile is much more like a locomotive
than a wagon.170 The automobile and the locomotive go at far greater
speeds than a wagon, and in their construction they are both more complex
than a wagon. A license is required to run a locomotive and to drive a car,
while none is needed to operate a wagon. 1 In short, the automobile, like
the locomotive, is a modern industrial machine, and the features that
signify the dangerousness of locomotive also apply to the automobile. 12
After providing precedential support for this characterization of an
automobile, the MacPherson brief takes up the privity issue. As a step
toward conceptual engineering, the brief likens an automobile to a
locomotive in very particular ways. It supplies some firm descriptive
footing for thinking about the nature of the risk at stake and how tort law
does and ought to evaluate that risk.
According to MacPherson's brief, the privity requirement is merely
technical when it comes to manufacturing chains, and if applied would
lead to circuitous pleading and interpleading between consumers,
manufacturers, and suppliers. The brief now begins to bear all the
hallmarks of legal realist argument. Specifically, it rejects form over
substantive justice, calls for the need for American courts to simplify
proceedings to accomplish this goal, and suggests the courts adopt a public
welfare justification for removing the privity limitation barring a plaintiff
like MacPherson from bringing suit against a manufacturer. Finally, the
brief makes the evaluative point that informs the emerging re-engineered
concept of negligence:
Surely one should not be maimed for life because of negligence in
the construction of an automobile he has purchased, without
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liability and satisfaction somewhere. Modern notions of decency
cannot tolerate such a result as that. And if there is to be sure
satisfaction it can hardly fail to attach to the manufacturer. The local
automobile dealer, I think it may be accepted as a matter of
common knowledge, although there are occasional exceptions, is
usually of insufficient means to respond in damages to an amount
sufficient to insure compensation to one injured. Either the
manufacturer must be held liable in such case, or those maimed
under such circumstances must abandon any thought of satisfaction
for their injuries. Nor should the intermediate dealer be held. He is
without fault-actual fault."'
Note that the evaluation is embedded in circumstantial or factual context.
It is an evaluation of responsibility, an assessment of obligation. Decency
imposes upon the party who makes the cars the obligation to compensate
for injuries inflicted by a negligently constructed one. There is the
recognition that evaluations are not timeless; modern notions of decency
are in play. Finally, the evaluation evinces a proto-Calabresian
pragmatism, as it is sensitive to those who can realistically afford to take
on the obligation now recognized.'14
Buick, the appellant, submitted a short reply brief to the Court of
Appeals.17 5 This brief revolved almost entirely around the 'inherently
dangerous'/'imminently dangerous' distinction, insisting upon the fact of
the distinction, that the case had been tried under the plaintiff's concession
that an automobile is not inherently dangerous, and that MacPherson's
brief to the Court of Appeals was an illicit attempt to change its theory of
the case.176 The reply brief then once more goes through the litany of
cases, insisting that each be interpreted so as to support Buick's case.

173. Id. at 23-24.
174. The MacPherson briefs treatment of one significant precedent merits attention. The brief
writer very effectively uses the entangled concept 'trap' the Devlin court used to justify ignoring the
privity requirement. In Devlin v. Smith, 89 N. Y. 470 (1882), workers who climbed upon scaffolding
erected by another business were killed and seriously injured when the scaffolding collapsed due to
negligent construction. The workers' employer was in privity with the scaffold builder, but the
workers themselves were not. The Devlin court applied the concept of a 'trap' to characterize the
dangerously tall and faultily constructed scaffold. 'Trap' covers not only a confined space or a restraint
on movement; the concept extends to any situation that involves hidden danger, risky to the justifiedly
unsuspecting. The danger depends on the facts about the space or the restraint. In Devlin, the fifty foot
scaffolding created a non-obvious risk of collapse. The MacPherson brief to the New York Court of
Appeals relies on Devlin to characterize the negligently defective automobile as also a trap,
"imperiling the life of any person who might go in it." Respondent's Brief, supra note 164, at 26.
175. Appellant's Reply Brief, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382 (1916), reprintedin
1 RECORDS AND Briefs OF LANDMARK BENJAMIN CARDOZO OPINIONS: Doc. No. 4, supra note 52.
176. Id. at 5.
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E. MacPherson v. Buick: Justice Cardozo
In MacPherson v. Buick II, Justice Cardozo's opinion for the majority
is conspicuously short compared with the lengthy briefs submitted to the
New York Court of Appeals. Cardozo indicates at the start of the opinion
that the plaintiff at trial, MacPherson, will prevail, when Cardozo quotes
Thomas v. Winchester: "The defendant's negligence ... put human life in
imminent danger.""' What was not apparent was the way Cardozo would
reach this result, discarding 'imminent danger'-an unsuccessful
entangled concept-in favor of reengineering a more reliable entangled
concept, 'negligence'.
Cardozo's opinion never referenced the 'inherent danger'/'imminent
danger' distinction to which the defendant devoted so much attention
during all phases of the trial. After some discussion of Thomas, which
Cardozo read to stand for the proposition that where "danger is to be
foreseen, there is a duty to avoid injury,"178 Cardozo declared the case "a
landmark of the law." 179 He then turned immediately to the line of cases
that the attorneys and courts had been discussing throughout the
proceedings in MacPherson.For each case, he showed that the courts are
always applying the principle that where there is a danger to be foreseen,
there is a duty to avoid injury. Sometimes it is applied more appropriately,
sometimes less, sometimes more generously, sometimes less; nevertheless,
the same principle is always applied. He concedes that Devlin v. Smith and
Statler v. Ray, the most recent cases, may "have extended the rule of
Thomas v. Winchester." 80 Exercising the prerogative of a jurisdiction's
highest court, Cardozo states, "If so, this court is committed to the
extension."8

Cardozo's factual summaries always emphasize the foreseeable risk of
injury to persons even if they were not the immediate purchaser of the
item. This is appellate engineering at its clearest. Through a recapitulation
of cases everybody thinks relevant to the one at hand, Cardozo gives
examples of the entanglement of the phenomenon of commercial
distribution and the obligation that arises from being the creator of known
and foreseeable risk in that context.
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Cardozo relied on English authority to clarify how of the concept of
'duty' would be restructured in the context of manufactured goods. He
found in Heaven v. Pender, penned by Lord Esher, a conception of duty
that sets aside the privity limitation:
Whenever one person supplies goods, or machinery, or the like, for
the purpose of their being used by another person under such
circumstances that every one of ordinary sense would, if he thought,
recognize at once that unless he used ordinary care and skill with
regard to the condition of the thing supplied or the mode of
supplying it, there will be danger of injury to the person or property
of him for whose use the thing is supplied, and who is to use it, a
duty arises to use ordinary care and skill as the condition or manner
of supplying such thing. 18 2
Cardozo noted that Lord Esher's associates did not unanimously adopt his
views and that Lord Esher may not even be offering accepted law in
England. Instead, Cardozo quotes Lord Esher because he stated the "tests
and standards of [New York] law."' 83 Cardozo then announced the holding
of his opinion:
We hold, then, that the principle of Thomas v. Winchester is not
limited to poisons, explosives, and things of like nature, to things
which in their normal operation are implements of destruction. If
the nature of a thing is such that it is reasonably certain to place life
and limb in peril when negligently made, it is then a thing of
danger.... If to the element of danger there is added knowledge
that the thing will be used by persons other than the purchaser, and
used without new tests, then, irrespective of contract, the
manufacturer of this thing of danger is under a duty to make it
carefully. 184
Cardozo's holding accomplishes two things. First, he abolishes the privity
limitation. Second, he abolishes the need for the concepts of 'imminent
danger' and 'inherent danger'. Rather than try to shore up either or both,
he dispenses with the pair in favor of engineering negligence's duty of
care with a focus on foreseeable, knowable risk.
Cardozo himself could not have foreseen how his engineering of
'negligence' in MacPherson would eventually lead to the concept's

182. Id. at 388 (quoting Heaven v. Pender,L. R. [11 Q. B. D.] 503).
183. Id. at 389.

184. Id.
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demise in deciding liability for manufacturing defects. Future courts
would do to 'negligence' what Cardozo did to 'privity'. After Cardozo's
opinion, judges in California and New Jersey engineered and used more
apt entangled concepts to replace 'negligence' as a conceptual tool for
considering manufacturer liability for product defects. They were able to
introduce principles of liability without fault precisely because Cardozo
had engineered 'negligence', by clearly intertwining the descriptive and
evaluative features of the modern manufacturing system and the
relationship of injurers to victims, to establish that a duty of care extended
from the former to the latter. By the 1950s and 1960s, courts realized that
this very entanglement called for a shift from manufacturer liability based
on 'negligence' to one that did not require a showing of manufacturer
fault.
III. ENTANGLEMENT, 'COMMERCE', 'TAX', AND THE AFFORDABLE
HEALTH CARE ACT

In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ('ACA')185
became law. The Act requires various measures from states, insurance
providers, and individuals, as well as the federal government, in order to
ensure much wider access to health care insurance, and thus to affordable
health care. The measures range from insisting that insurance companies
extend coverage to people with 'preexisting conditions' to mandating that,
with some exceptions, individuals purchase health insurance or remit a
payment with their federal income tax return (the 'Individual Mandate').
My aim is not to undertake a full analysis of the ACA or the legal and
political reaction it has provoked, rather, I will review the opinions in the
recent Supreme Court case' 8 6 where the Court decided that the Individual
Mandate is not unconstitutional. This case gives us a timely example of
how the Supreme Court engineers entangled constitutional concepts, just
as other appellate courts law courts engineer entangled common law
concepts. A brief consideration of Supreme Court decisions related to the
Commerce Clause demonstrates how an appellate court, here the Supreme
Court, engineers concepts horizontally over time as well as vertically
through adjudication of a single dispute. The majority and minority
opinions in the ACA also illustrate competing constructions of the
entangled legal concept 'commerce', and how that competition can yield
results that surprise those focused on the particular case, but are perhaps

185. Pub. L. No. 11-148, 123 Stat. 119.
186. Nat'l Fed. of Indep. Bus. et al. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.

,

132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
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less surprising when considered from the vantage point of the larger
appellate judicial practice of engineering entangled concepts.
A. Glance at the PriorEngineeringof 'Commerce'
The Commerce Clause' 8 of the United States Constitution has always
received judicial attention. The United States Supreme Court has
engineered and re-engineered the concept of commerce, as introduced in
the U.S. Constitution, which has then been used repeatedly by Congress as
the basis for enacting national law. Starting with Gibbons v. Ogdon, 88 one
of the earliest adjudications under the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice
Marshall implicitly realized that the concept of commerce as used in the
Constitution demanded engineering, specifically engineering keyed to the
entangled nature of the concept as a United States constitutional legal
concept. In Gibbons, Marshall worked with the public welfare values-the
collective benefit-American federalism attaches to a single regulatory
authority and the establishment of a national market, respectively, and the
empirical role of aquatic navigation as it bore on those values to develop
the legal concept of commerce. His engineering led him to decide that
Congress could regulate all commercial aquatic navigation, even if the
facts of a particular case involve a specific location upon those waters
within a single state. Marshall wrote:
The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution [sic]
being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of
definition, to ascertain the extent of the power, it becomes necessary
to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee
would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or the interchange of
commodities, and do not admit that it comprehends navigation. This
would restrict a general term, applicable to many objects, to one of
its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is
something more: it is intercourse. It describes the commercial
intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches,
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that
intercourse. The mind can scarcely conceive a system for regulating
commerce between nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning
navigation, which shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of
the one nation into the ports of the other, and be confined to

187. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
188. 22 U.S. 1(1824).
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prescribing rules for the conduct of individuals, in the actual
employment of buying and selling, or of barter. 189
Marshall then devotes much of his opinion to explaining that the concept
of commerce includes commercial navigation, relying on the framers'
understanding of commerce in a federated United States and their reasons
for granting power over commerce among the states to the federal
government. 190 In this way, he articulates, explains, and engineers the
already entangled concept of commerce as it appears in the United States
Constitution, identifying much of the mixture of evaluative and empirical
factors that have animated the Supreme Court's re-engineering of
commerce to the present day.
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Supreme Court
attempted to engineer the concept of 'commerce' by creating a principled
line between the concepts 'local' and 'interstate' or between 'direct' and
'indirect' effects on interstate commerce.
These efforts to rely on
subsidiary entangled concepts suffered from problems similar to those that
plagued the term 'inherently dangerous'. When Congress tried to regulate
wages and hours or child labor, the Court did not look to the national
commercial implications of these matters, but instead relied on intuitions
about what they thought was 'local' or what counted as a 'direct' effect on
commerce.192 In an effort to pin down descriptive reach without careful
attention to evaluative concerns, the Court's formal categories tended to
look both unprincipled and detached from the empirical realities of
modern markets and modern government.
The New Deal famously changed the Court's approach to engineering
'commerce'. After President Franklin D. Roosevelt's court-packing
threat,19 3 the Court reexamined the nature of a national market regulated
by a single authority in a modern economy. Starting with NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel,194 the Court recognized the interdependence of labor

189. Id. at 189-90.
190. Id. at 190-96.
191. See, e.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546-51 (1935). See also Barry Cushman, Formalism and
Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence,67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1089 (2000).
192. See, e.g, E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. at 42-43.
193.

See Roosevelt's

"Court Packing" Plan, JUDICIARY.SENATE.Gov,

http:/wwwjudiciary

.senate.gov/about/history/CourtPacking.cfm (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (describing the Supreme
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relations at one location and the entire national supply chain involved in
steel production spread throughout the country. 195 Once the Court covered
this sort of interdependence with the concept of 'commerce', the Court
upheld a variety of Congressional actions. Of special note is Wickard v.
Fillburn,196 where a single farmer exceeding the allotted acreage
permissible for him to farm was penalized under the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of 1938. Wickard contended that his activity had virtually
no effect on interstate commerce because he was raising wheat for his own
consumptions on the extra acreage; thus he was not involved in commerce,
let alone interstate commerce.197 Without considering the Court's previous
engineering of 'commerce', Wickard's position may seem plausible. But
the Supreme Court upheld the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 as
applied to Wickard. The Court recognized that concept of 'commerce'
extended to national markets and that some noncommercial, intrastate
activity could, in the aggregate, substantially affect national markets. 9 8
Note that the Court did not rule that Wickard's cultivation of wheat for
personal consumption was itself commerce; the concept does not expand
in that direction. 199 Rather, the Court decided that the connection between
that activity and commerce gave sufficiently substantial reason to
200
Congress to regulate Wickard in the service of interstate commerce.
In Wickard, the Court used values borne of American federalism to
expand federal power. But, values rooted in American federalism can also
tilt toward protecting states from encroachments by the federal
government. In Lopez v. United States201 and then in Morrison v. United
States,202 the Court struck down federal criminal statutes that regulated,
respectively, gun possession near schools and domestic violence against
women. In both cases, the Court based its invalidation of the respective
statutes on federalism values. The Court rejected the claim that
'commerce' could be defined so broadly as to reach these two areas of
conduct, not because they do not affect national markets, but because the
conduct in question seemed to the court to fall squarely within traditional
203
jurisdiction of the states in their exercise of their police powers2. The
195. Id. at 34-42.

196. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
197. Id. at 119.
198. Id. at 127 28.

199. Id.
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201.
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514 U.S. 549 (1995).
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Id. at 645.
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Court insisted that dual-sovereignty values of federalism, according to
which neither the central government nor the states should wholly swallow
the other's authority, demanded protection of the sphere in which the
states exert police power to the exclusion of Congressional action. 2 04 For
present purposes, the point is to note that just as the Court has used the
entanglement of federalism values and circumstances of specific cases to
engineer 'commerce' in a way that undergirds broad federal power so too
it has used entanglement to engineer 'commerce' to deny such support. As
in Wickard, the Lopez and Morrison Courts re-engineered boundaries of
'commerce' by attending to the intermeshed values and facts involved in
the concept and the circumstances of the case.
B. The ACA and the Constitutionalityof the IndividualMandate
The original lawsuits over the constitutionality of the ACA seemed to
set the stage for another precedent-setting engineering of the constitutional
concept of commerce. Detractors introduced a distinction novel to
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, the activity/inactivity distinction, as the
basis for shaping the concept of commerce to exclude the federal
government from in any way requiring individuals to purchase health
insurance. Supporters relied on a more conventional economic
understanding of markets to shape the concept of commerce to take
account of the particularly glaring and pernicious risks of free-riding and
moral hazard when it comes to health insurance and health care and that
encompasses a requirement that individuals obtain health insurance.
In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 05 the
ACA case that reached the Supreme Court, the Court upheld the
constitutionality of the individual mandate. The Court's opinion, penned
by Chief Justice Robets, denied the mandate's constitutionality under the
Commerce Clause, but upheld its constitutinality under the Taxing Power,
maintaining that Congress may tax those who do not purchase health
insurance, so long as that tax does not amount to a fine.206 Five justices
agreed on both holdings, but a different set of four agreed on each. The
four justices who joined the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court agreed
that the mandate could be regarded as a tax within Congress' authority to
impose, but they also endorsed a concept of commerce that would have

204. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 577, 580.
205. 132 S. Ct. 2566.
206. Id. at 2594-600.
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supported upholding the mandate on Commerce Clause grounds as well. 2 07
Four dissenting justices rejected the treatment of the mandate as a tax,
insisting that the constitutionality of the measure depended solely on its
legitimacy under the Commerce Clause, which they denied.20 8 From a
precedential perspective, therefore, National Federation does not provide
a definitive engineering of 'commerce'. It does, however, include two
rival engineering efforts.
First, consider Justice Ginsberg's defense of the individual mandate as
a constitutionally permitted regulation of interstate commerce. Her point
of departure is 1937, when the Supreme Court first "recognized Congress'
large authority to set the Nation's course in the economic and social
welfare realm."209 The circumstances and welfare outlook of that era
inform Ginsberg's engineering of 'commerce'. She notes at the outset that
the 1937 Court defended "Congress' efforts to regulate the national
economy in the interest of those who labor to sustain it." 21 0 This
observation immediately entangles individual welfare and regulation of
the national economy. The needs of individual laborers and the very
existence of a nationwide market-economy must be considered jointly.
Such an economy cannot exist without protecting the welfare of individual
laborers, and it is through the work of healthy, financially secure
individuals that a national economy thrives.
Ginsberg then turns to what she regards as the relevant current
circumstances facing Congress when passing the ACA by describing the
magnitude and extent of the "national market for health-care products and
services." 211 Next, she details the ways in which this market differs from
others markets by demonstrating how an individual's decision not to
purchase health insurance has affirmative ramifications that echo across
the national market for health-care products and services.2 12 Then she
takes up the empirical matter of why the states, acting in their individual
capacity, cannot solve the national problems of free-riding and unfair cost-

207. Id. at 2609 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg also questioned the necessity of
rejecting the Governments commerce power argument, given that the mandate could be upheld under
the taxing power. Id. at 2627. This argument was summarily rejected by Chief Justice Roberts in his
lead opinion. Id. at 2600-01. The opinions in the case also address the Anti-Injunction Act and the
ACA provisions expanding Medicaid, but these issues are beyond the scope of the current discussion.
208. Id. at 2642.
209. Id. at 2609.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2609-12. See also Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Dep't of Health and Human Serv.
v. Florida (2012) (No. 11-398), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oralarguments/argument
transcripts/1 1-398-Tuesday.pdf

20121

THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF APPELLATE ADJUDICATION

101

shifting in the market for health-care products and services. She explains
that any state that tries health-care market reform on its own makes itself
unduly attractive to the unhealthy, setting off a cycle of increasing
premiums and taxes likely to provoke healthier people to exit the state, an
exit that would, in turn, further hike premiums and taxes.213
Ginsberg sees the health-care market as national in scope and its
market failures as necessitating nation-wide solutions. She maintains that
the measures the ACA adopts-guaranteed issue of insurance, community
rating, and the individual mandate-are necessarily interrelated so as to
specifically target problems that arise because of the nature of health care
as it is provided in this country and the collective action problem faced by
the separate States who might attempt reform.2 14 Under Ginsberg's
engineering, the constitutional concept of 'commerce' encompasses a
complex interplay of market forces all bearing on individual welfare.
Congressionally authorized federal intervention at any stage thus qualifies
as a legitimate regulation of commerce.
This conception of 'commerce' is in contrast with Chief Justice
Roberts' approach. Roberts opens his opinion for the Court with an
extended discussion of state sovereignty and the limited powers of the
federal government.2 He leads with quotations from the Marshall Court
of the first quarter of the 19th century. 216 Against that background, Roberts
takes up the issues posed in the case itself. When he turns to the
constitutionality of the individual mandate, he acknowledges the market
failures that have plagued the national health-care market. 217 But despite
this recognition, he rejects the individual mandate as an appropriate
exercise of power under the Commerce Clause on the ground that the
individual mandate does not regulate "commercial activity," but instead
tries to "create" it by compelling individuals to buy health insurance. 218
In Roberts' view, the world that follows from a concept of commerce
that permits Congress to call upon individuals to buy health insurance is a
world in which Congress could force individuals to purchase any good or
service whatsoever.219 Roberts casts a Ginsberg-like version of
'commerce' as one that cannot distinguish between different markets

213.
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215.
216.
217.
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132 S.Ct. at2612.
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depending on the nature of the good or service traded.220 Thus, according
to Roberts, that concept of commerce would license Congress to supplant
the individual states as the sovereigns with "police powers," the authority
to act in the interests of citizens and residents' welfare. 221 Moreover,
Roberts insists upon the constitutional unacceptability of any engineering
of 'commerce' that does not clearly and definitively respect state
sovereignty and the states as the repository of police powers. He states:
"The Commerce Clause is not a general license to regulate an individual
from cradle to grave . . . . Any police power to regulate individuals as such
... remains vested in the States."222 Where Ginsberg engineers

'commerce' to highlight the necessity for national intervention in national
markets, Roberts would prefer to engineer 'commerce' to minimize the
reach of the federal government, making sure to interpose the states.
Although Roberts rejects Ginsberg's engineering of 'commerce', he
does not conclude that Congress has no constitutionally enumerated power
that authorizes the specific Congressional regulation in question, the
individual mandate. Instead, Roberts examines the Constitution's granting
to the federal Congress the power "To lay and collect taxes . . . to ...

provide for . .. the general welfare of the United States." 2 23
The ACA never calls the payment to the government for failure to
purchase health insurance a "tax." The four justices, who would have ruled
the individual mandate unconstitutional, consider this choice of language
to forestall any further consideration of whether the payment is,
nevertheless, a tax. 224 But the Chief Justice grasps the difference between a
label and a concept, and argues for asking "whether the shared
responsibility payment falls within Congress's taxing power,
'[d]isregarding the designation of the exaction, and viewing its substance
and application."' 225 The label does not determine the concept in play;
rather, the evidence for which concept best covers the payment relates to
what it involves empirically and purposefully. Entanglement guides
conceptual engineering.
Roberts describes looking beyond the choice of word as a "functional"
approach.226 He considers another Supreme Court case where the Court
looked to "practical characteristics" to decide that a payment labeled a

220.
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224.
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Id. at 2591.
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
132 S. Ct. at 2650-55.
Id. at 2595 (quoting United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935)).
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"tax" was, conceptually speaking, actually a penalty.22 Robert's
exploration of the 'tax'/'penalty' distinction displays sensitivity to how
empirical and evaluative overtones inextricably inform one another in each
concept. He considers enforcement and collection methods, whether the
payment presupposes intentional wrongdoing, and whether classic
criminal sanctions or measures are involved. 228 These considerations,
brought to bear on the "shared responsibility payment," bring it within the
scope of 'tax' rather than 'penalty'. 22 9 Roberts insists that, "[w]hile the
individual mandate clearly aims to induce the purchase of health
insurance, it need not be read to declare that failing to do so is
unlawful." 23 0 The payment to be collected by the IRS from those who do
not purchase health insurance lacks the coercive, stigmatizing flavor of
criminal punishments; one can lawfully choose to make the payment
rather than buy insurance.
The turn to 'tax' made it possible for the Chief Justice to find common
ground with four of his colleagues, despite their sharp rejection of his
treatment of 'commerce.' The concept of commerce proved to be too
fraught with competing views of the relevant factual-evaluative
considerations for that concept to lend itself to an agreed-upon
engineering. Consequently, National Federation teaches us something
important about entangled legal concepts: they come in sets or clusters.
When one concept cannot be engineered to garner sufficient judicial
endorsement, this can pave the way for another entangled concept to come
into play, a concept that at first may not have seemed to be important to
deciding a case. The ACA case illustrates what can happen when one
entangled concept comes to lend itself to being engineered in radically
different ways, specifically when judicial users of the concept understand
the mesh of fact and value so differently that it drives them to see the same
measure as clearly within or clearly outside the boundaries of 'commerce'.
When judges are not able to agree on how to further engineer the
entanglement, the concept gets sidelined, and the decision in the case
forces the use and further engineering of another concept entirely, in this
case 'tax'.

Having used the MacPherson litigation to illustrate how state appellate
courts engineer entangled concepts within a single case involving the
common law, this article aims in this discussion to illustrate how the
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Supreme Court acts similarly while engineering, over time, entangled
concepts featured in the Constitutional text. This has circumscribed my
analysis of the decision and opinions in National Federation. A more
comprehensive study would examine later twentieth century civil rights
cases decided under the Commerce Clause and would explore other
instances of federal judicial conceptual engineering of 'tax'. The current
analysis shows that both the state appellate courts and the U.S. Supreme
Court recognize and utilize entanglement when engineering legal
concepts. Sensitivity to and engagement with entanglement to achieve
practicable legal concepts is the hallmark of appellate adjudication in the
United States, whether the adjudication concerns constitutional law or
common law.
IV. CONCLUSION

Quantum mechanics represented a departure from classical physics
because quantum mechanics forced recognition of entanglement in the
physical world. Similarly, appreciating how courts attend, and must attend,
to description and evaluation when they discard or rework legal concepts,
points legal analysis away from the more traditional commitment to a
fact/value divide held by analytic philosophers and some jurisprudential
scholars. Schrodinger maintained that we can understand the physical
world more fully (if not definitely) when we accept the phenomenon of
entanglement rather than trying to root our knowledge in an understanding
of entangled objects behaving in isolation from one another. Analogously,
this article maintains that we can better understand the law if we accept
that legal concepts entangle fact and value, and root our analysis of law in
examining specific entanglements engineered by courts over time.
Continually applying and engineering entangled legal concepts,
appellate courts exercise great legal power. Appellate adjudication
structures simultaneously our perception and our evaluation of
circumstances. With entangled concepts, appellate courts taxonomize the
landscape of our disputes. In turn, these taxonomies decide the issues at
stake. While the concepts and taxonomies impose internal constraints on
what can be done with them, or done persuasively, the engineer can
structure and restructure both concepts and taxonomies, thereby making
powerful differences in how cases get resolved. For Buick, the decision in
MacPherson meant a transformation in its business model. A relatively
fledgling industry had to bear either the costs of improving safety or
paying damages in negligence. For drivers, cars got safer but also more
expensive. Supreme Court decisions about 'commerce' order relations
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between states, the federal legislature, and citizens, an ordering that
influences almost every aspect of life in the United States.
Despite the call for and the need for law students to learn to deal with
all sorts of legal processes and materials, appellate cases have proven to be
an enduring part of the law school curriculum. Understanding appellate
adjudication as the engineering of entangled legal concepts both explains
and justifies this staying power. Coming to understand how entangled
legal concepts are engineered, even explicitly engaging in reverse
engineering, is not only an intriguing intellectual exercise, it is also
instruction in a craft, perhaps even an art, uniquely performed by lawyers.
Furthermore, because of the tendency of entangled legal concepts to
migrate between statutes and cases, lawyers working with the former have
as much need to understand the nature and inner workings of entangled
concepts as do lawyers who deal more with latter. Indeed, an appreciation
of the ubiquity of entangled legal concepts in legal materials might help us
transcend the pedagogical dichotomy between teaching statutes, which is
often equated with public law, and cases, which is often equated with
private law. Appellate courts engineer entangled legal concepts used in
both arenas. What this article accomplishes is sufficient to suggest that a
focus on cases, or a certain kind of focus on them, is not just a holdover
from a worn out tradition in legal pedagogy, but is, rather, a necessary part
of understanding the American legal system and thereby American law.

